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I. INTRODUCTION
1
 
After the Supreme Court ruled on June 28, 2004, in Rasul v. 
Bush
2
 and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
3
 that the Guantánamo detainees were 
entitled to access to federal court through the writ of habeas corpus, 
the U.S. Department of Defense established processes to review the 
status of all detainees, many of whom had been held without any pro-
 
 * Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, and Director of Seton Hall 
University School of Law Center for Policy and Research. 
 ** Partner, Denbeaux & Denbeaux.  Co-Authors Prof. Mark Denbeaux and Jo-
shua Denbeaux represent two Guantánamo detainees.  This Report also benefited 
from the research and contributions of Grace Byrd, Jill Camarote, Doug Eadie, 
Christopher Fox, Brielle Goldfaden, Mark Muoio, Courtney Ray, Laura Sims, and 
Lauren Winchester. 
 1 This Report, originally published on November 17, 2006, used government da-
ta obtained from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation to profile over 517 
detainees held at Guantánamo.  The primary sources used were the Combatant Sta-
tus Review Tribunal (CSRT) files.  Since this Report’s initial publication, the detai-
nee population at Guantánamo has been reduced to 171.  The Guantánamo Docket, 
N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/held (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2011).  In addition, more information has been made available through lat-
er government releases and WikiLeaks.  This Report was not updated based on Wiki-
Leaks.  For future reports by the Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Pol-
icy and Research (the “Center”), visit the Center’s website 
at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/Guantan
amo-Reports.cfm. 
 2 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004). 
 3 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004). 
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ceeding for two and a half years.  Within one month of Rasul and 
Hamdi, the Defense Department created the Combatant Status Re-
view Tribunals (CSRTs) and established a process for hearings before 
the CSRTs.
4
  Each CSRT was composed of three unidentified mem-
bers of the military who presided over the hearings.
5
  As soon as most 
of the CSRT hearings were completed, the government informed the 
district court in which the habeas proceedings were pending that, de-
spite the Supreme Court’s ruling, no further judicial action was nec-
essary because the detainees received CSRT hearings.
6
 
This Report analyzes the CSRT proceedings, comparing the 
hearing process that the Defense Department promised the detainees 
with the process actually provided.  The Report is based on the 
records that the U.S. government produced for 393 of the 558 detai-
nees who had CSRT hearings until 2004. 
The most important documents in this record were produced by 
the government in response to orders by U.S. district court judges 
that the Department of Defense provide the entire record of the 
CSRT for review by counsel for at least 102 detainees.
7
  These are de-
scribed as habeas-compelled “full CSRT returns.”
8
  Without these 
documents, it would be possible only to review the process promised.  
With the 102 full CSRT returns, this Report can also compare the 
process promised with the process provided. 
The results of this review are startling.  The process that was 
promised was modest at best.  The process that was actually provided 
was far less than the written procedures appeared to require.  The de-
 
 4 Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’y of the 
Navy, (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter Memorandum Establishing CSRT], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
 5 Id. at 1.  
 6 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (granting habeas corpus to Guantánamo detainees); 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (leaving open the possibility that a properly constructed mili-
tary tribunal that affords detainees the fundamental due process guarantees is consti-
tutional).  On February 9, 2006, the Department of Defense announced that the 
CSRTs were complete.  Press Release, Office of the Assistant Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t. 
of Def., No. 124-06, Guantánamo Bay Detainee Administrative Review Board Deci-
sions Completed (2006), available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2006/02/sec-060209-
dod01.htm. 
 7 See Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) & Admin. Review Bd. (ARB) Docu-
ments, OFFICE SECRETARY DEF. & JOINT STAFF, U.S. DEP’T  DEF.: FOIA REQUEST SERVICE 
CENTER, http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans 
/Detainee/csrt_arb/index.htm(last visited Oct. 20, 2011)[hereinafter CSRT Docu-
ments] (containing CSRT and ARB records).  
 8 At the time of this writing, only 102 full CSRTs were available.  Since 2006, 
many more CSRT proceedings have taken place.   
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tainees were denied any right to counsel.
9
  Instead, they were assigned 
a “personal representative” who advised each detainee that the per-
sonal representative was neither his lawyer nor his advocate and that 
anything that the detainee said could be used against him.
10
  In con-
trast to the detainee’s lack of counsel, the tribunal was required to 
have at least one lawyer and the procedures recommended that the 
recorder (prosecutor) be a lawyer.
11
 
The assigned role of the personal representative was to assist the 
detainee with presenting his case.
12
  In practice, any assistance was 
extraordinarily limited.  The records of meetings between detainees 
and their personal representatives indicate that in 78% of the cases, 
the personal representative met with the detainee only once.  The 
meetings were as short as ten minutes, and this included time for 
translation.  Approximately 13% of the meetings were twenty minutes 
or less, and more than half of the meetings lasted no more than an 
hour. 
During a meeting, the detainee was told the following: 
? The CSRT proceeding was his opportunity to contest the 
government’s finding that he was an enemy combatant.
13
 
? The government had already found the detainee to be 
an enemy combatant at multiple levels of review.
14
 
? The government’s finding rested upon classified evi-
dence that the detainee would not see.
15
  
? The tribunal had to presume that the secret classified 
evidence was reliable and valid.
16
 
In the majority of the CSRT hearings, the government rested on 
the presumption that the classified evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish that the detainee was an enemy combatant.
17
  The government 
 
 9 Memorandum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’ys of the Military 
Dep’ts, et al., at Enclosure (1), C(3) (July 14, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum Pro-
cedures CSRT], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf. 
 10 Id.  
 11 Id. at Enclosure (1), C(2).   
 12 Id. at Enclosure (3), C.  
 13 Id. at Enclosure (3), C(1)–(2). 
 14 Id. at Enclosure (4).   
 15 Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (3), C(4). 
 16 See id. at Enclosure (3). 
 17 See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 1, Hicks v. 
United States, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2004)[hereinafter Summary, Hicks], 
available at 
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never called any witnesses and rarely adduced unclassified evidence.
18
  
In the majority of cases, the government provided the detainee with 
no evidence, declassified or classified, that established that the detai-
nee was an enemy combatant.  Instead, the government provided the 
detainee merely with what it purported to be a summary of the classi-
fied evidence.
19
  This summary was so conclusory that it precluded 
any meaningful response.  The government then relied on the pre-
sumption that the secret evidence was reliable and accurate.
20
 
In the minority of cases, the government produced declassified 
evidence to the tribunal.
21
  Such declassified evidence did not bear 
directly on the question at issue.  It consisted of letters from the de-
tainee’s family and friends asking for his release, portions of habeas 
corpus petitions submitted by the detainee’s own lawyers on his be-
half in a U.S. district court, and publicly available records that did not 
mention the detainee by name.
22
  None of the declassified evidence 
introduced against any detainee contained any specific information 
about the government’s basis for the detainee’s detention as an ene-
my combatant. 
Detainees who participated in CSRT proceedings were not able 
to confront all of the government’s evidence.  The government never 
called witnesses and did not typically produce any unclassified evi-
dence.  When such evidence was presented to the tribunal, in 93% of 
the hearings, the detainee never saw it.  Regarding the detainees’ 
ability to produce evidence, only 11% of the detainees were allowed 
to introduce any evidence of their own.  The promised CSRT process 
provided that detainees could call witnesses,
23
 but no witness from 
 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf.  
 18 See, e.g., id. 
 19 See, e.g., Letter from Officer in Charge, CSRT, to Pers. Representatives (Sept. 7, 
2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000001-
000100.pdf. 
 20 With regard to classified evidence, the tribunal panel stated, “[t]he Tribunal 
also relied on certain classified evidence in reaching its decision.”  Summary, Hicks, 
supra note 17, at 1.   
 21 See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Decision at 1–2, Abdullah 
v. Bush, No. 05-301 (D.D.C. July 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_92-190.pdf; Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Decision 
at 1–2, Awad v. United States, No. 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_2991-3070.pdf.   
 22 See, e.g., id. 
 23 See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), F(6). 
DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX_NO HEARING_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2011  9:09 AM 
2011] NO HEARING HEARINGS 1235 
outside Guantánamo ever appeared.  The only witnesses the govern-
ment allowed detainees to call were other detainees.
24
  Therefore, the 
only witnesses that were allowed under the CSRT process were pre-
sumed enemy combatants testifying in favor of other presumed ene-
my combatants. 
The promised CSRT process stated that detainees would be al-
lowed to produce documentary evidence.
25
  In operation, the only 
documentary evidence that detainees were actually allowed to intro-
duce were letters from family and friends.
26
  This was true even when 
the documentary evidence sought to be introduced was available and 
even when the documents were in the government’s possession—
such as passports.  In these cases, the detainee insisted that the doc-
uments would prove that the charges against him could not be true, 
but none of the documents were permitted to be introduced.
27
 
The detainee’s personal representative was completely silent in 
12% of the hearings, and in only 52% of the hearings did the person-
al representative make substantive comments.  Sometimes, the subs-
tantive comments of the personal representative, however, advocated 
for the government and against the detainee.
28
  At the end of the 
hearing, the personal representative had a final opportunity to make 
comments, but the personal representative explicitly chose not to do 
so 98% of the times. 
In sum, while the promised procedures stated that detainees 
were allowed to present evidence (witnesses and documents), the on-
 
 24 See, e.g., Memorandum from PR23 to CSRT Legal Advisor, Al Kandari v. Bush, 
No. 02-CV-0828 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2004)[hereinafter Memo, Al Kandari], available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_2737-2868.pdf; Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Deci-
sion at 1, Hassen v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1254 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2004)[hereinafter Sum-
mary, Hassen], available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_3444-3577.pdf.  
 25 See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), G(9)(C). 
 26 See, e.g., Summarized Detainee Statement at 1–2, Al Wadi v. Bush, No. 04-
CV1227 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2004)[hereinafter Statement, Al Wadi], available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_444-565.pdf. 
 27 See e.g., Dep’t of Def., Testimony of Detainees Before the Combatant Status Re-
view Panel Set 16, at 1424–28, available at  
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/Set_16_13
63-1446.pdf. 
 28 See, e.g., Transcript of CSRT Record at 6–7, Al Hilal v. Bush, No. 05-1048 
(D.D.C. Jul. 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_4818-4946.pdf. 
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ly evidence that the detainees were permitted to offer in the vast ma-
jority of the cases was their own testimony.  As a result, the only op-
tion available to the detainee was to make a statement attempting to 
rebut what he could glean from the summary of classified evidence 
that he could not see.  In 81% of the cases reviewed, the tribunals 
made the decision the same day as the hearing.  Among the 102 
records reviewed for this Report, the ultimate decision was always un-
animous, and all detainees reviewed were ultimately found to be 
enemy combatants.  It is true that government statements indicate 
that 38 of 558 detainees were ultimately found to not be enemy com-
batants, but no such determinations are found in the full CSRT 
records reviewed. 
While all detainees whose CSRT records were reviewed for this 
Report were ultimately found to be enemy combatants, not all tri-
bunals found a certain detainee to be an enemy combatant.  On 
three occasions, a tribunal initially found that the detainee was not an 
enemy combatant.
29
  In such cases, the detainee was never told of this 
decision.  Instead, the tribunal’s decision was reviewed at multiple le-
vels in the Defense Department chain of command, and eventually a 
new tribunal was convened.
30
  Some detainees, however, were still 
found to not be enemy combatants.
31
  At least one detainee’s record 
indicates that after a second tribunal determined that he was no 
longer an enemy combatant, the process was repeated, and his case 
was sent back for a third hearing after which the tribunal ultimately 
found him to be an enemy combatant.
32
 
II. THE DATA 
In response to Rasul and Hamdi, the Department of Defense 
created the CSRT system and processed each detainee.
33
  This Report 
analyzes the data released by the Department of Defense about the 
CSRT proceedings in response to Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requests and through discovery during habeas lawsuits.  Subs-
 
 29 This fact is not formally published in any records but was discovered through a 
careful review of documents produced under court order in the habeas litigations.  
At least one example can be gleaned from the record of ISN 556.  Memorandum 
from James R. Crisfield Jr., Legal Advisor, to Dir., Combatant Status Review Tribunal  
at 2839, Abdulla v. Bush, No. 05-1001 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2006), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_2737-2868.pdf. 
 30 See id.  
 31 See id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See Memorandum Establishing CSRT, supra note 4. 
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tantive data regarding individual detainees has never been voluntarily 
released by the Department of Defense. 
According to the available Defense Department data, until 2006, 
when this Report was compiled, there were 759 total detainees incar-
cerated at Guantánamo since its creation;
34
 558 of those detainees re-
ceived hearings before the CSRT.
35
  The Department of Defense pre-
sumably created a file for each of the 558 CSRT proceedings, which 
we will refer to as the “full CSRT record.”  Because the government 
has not released these files, except under court orders entered in the 
various habeas proceedings, the 102 full CSRT returns were the only 
full CSRT records that could be analyzed in this Report. 
Each detainee was provided the right to appear before the 
CSRT.
36
  At least 361 detainees chose to participate, and a “Summa-
rized Detainee Statement” was prepared from their testimony in each 
case.
37
  This Report refers to these “Summarized Detainee State-
ments” as “transcripts” although they are not verbatim records.  A 
transcript was provided for those hearings in which the detainee was 
physically present and for those hearings in which the detainee had 
the personal representative read a statement into the record.
38
  The 
Department of Defense initially refused to release any of these tran-
scripts, but a FOIA lawsuit brought by the Associated Press succeeded 
and these documents were released.
39
  This Report examines these 
102 full CSRT returns and 356 transcripts as those were the only doc-
uments that the government had released at the time the Report was 
compiled. 
 
 34 See List of Individuals Detained by the Dep’t of Def. at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba from 
Jan. 2002 through May 15, 2006, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (May 15, 2006), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/May2006/d20060515%20List.pdf.  As of October 
2011, there are 171 detainees still held at Guantánamo.  See The Guantanamo Docket: A 
History of the Detainee Population, NYTIMES.COM, available at 
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo. 
 35  This Report does not consider the “high value detainees” transferred to Guan-
tánamo Bay in September 2006.  See Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces Press Service, 
High-Value Detainees Moved to Gitmo; Bush Proposes Detainee Legislation, DEFENSE.GOV 
(Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=721. 
 36 See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (4). 
 37 See CSRT Documents, supra note 7. 
 38 See, e.g., Summarized Unsworn Detainee Statement, Al Edah v. Bush, No. 05-
280 (D.D.C. July 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_191-236.pdf. 
 39  The Department of Defense released 356 transcripts through the FOIA re-
quest; there are five additional detainee transcripts among the 102 full CSRT returns 
reviewed in this Report.  Therefore, a total of 361 transcripts existed. 
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Because only 356 transcripts were released, it can be concluded 
that 202 of the 558 detainees did not participate in the CSRT process.  
But because five of the 102 full CSRT returns contain transcripts that 
were not among the 356 FOIA-released transcripts, it is apparent that 
these 356 transcripts did not contain the records of all detainees who 
participated in the CSRT. 
Although the 102 full CSRT returns contained sixty-nine returns 
with transcripts, eleven of the returns with transcripts contained only 
conversations between the personal representative and the tribunal.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the 102 full CSRT records re-
viewed include records of fifty-eight detainees who appeared in the 
CSRT proceeding and forty-four detainees who did not physically ap-
pear.  Additionally, thirty-eight full CSRT returns of detainees did not 
have transcripts released in the Associated Press FOIA request; no 
other information was released by the Department of Defense.   
The 356 FOIA transcripts combined with the thirty-eight full 
CSRT returns total 394 detainee records, which make up our full 
sample set.  These 394 records reveal that 324 detainees physically 
appeared before the Tribunal.  The data collected on the thirty-eight 
detainees without FOIA-released transcripts constitutes the only in-
formation available about the 202 detainees whose transcripts were 
not produced by the FOIA request. 
In short, of the entire 558 detainees at Guantánamo who parti-
cipated in the CSRT process up until 2006, there was some documen-
tation for 394 detainees: the 356 FOIA-released transcripts (sixty-four 
of which also have full CSRT returns) and the 38 full CSRT returns 
whose transcripts were not released by the FOIA.
40
 
III. CREATION OF THE CSRTS 
Rasul and Hamdi were decided on June 28, 2004.
41
  The Depart-
ment of Defense issued an order establishing the CSRTs on July 7, 
2004
42
 and an order implementing the process on 29, 2004.
43
  Guan-
 
 40  The two different data sets upon which this Report is based have been com-
pared with the profile of all of the detainees that was first made public on February 8, 
2006.  MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., A REPORT ON GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 
517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEP’T OF DEF. DATA, (2008), available at 
http://law.shu.edu/news/Guantánamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf.  The correlation 
between the data previously analyzed and the data considered in this Report is very 
strong.  
 41 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 42 Memorandum Establishing CSRT, supra note 4.  
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tánamo personnel hand delivered a letter to every detainee, advising 
him both of the upcoming CSRT and of his right, independent of the 
CSRT, to file a habeas corpus suit in a U.S. district court.
44
  The entire 
CSRT procedure was promulgated in only thirty-two days.
45
 
As the CSRTs were being convened in Guantánamo, the De-
partment of Defense was responding to habeas proceedings in Wash-
ington, D.C.  The response, beginning in August 2004, justified the 
CSRT as providing the appropriate hearing to which detainees were 
entitled under Rasul.
46
  The goal was to demonstrate that, because a 
sufficient hearing had been held for each detainee, no federal court 
habeas hearings were required.
47
 
According to the CSRT procedures established in the July 29, 
2004 memorandum, prior to the commencement of any CSRT pro-
ceeding, the classified evidence relevant to that detainee had to be 
reviewed, a “summary of evidence” prepared, and a personal repre-
sentative appointed for the detainee.
48
  The personal representative 
then had to meet with the detainee, and then a tribunal would be 
convened.
49
  According to the records reviewed by the Seton Hall Law 
research team, the first hearing was for detainee ISN 220
50
 and was 
held on August 2, 2004.  For that hearing, the personal representative 
met with the detainee on July 31, 2004—two days after the CSRT pro-
 
 43 Memorandum from Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, to the Sec’ys of the 
Military Dep’ts, et al. (Jul. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Memorandum Implementing 
CSRT], available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf. 
 44 While the right to proceed in federal court may have been extinguished by the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in 
scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) at the time, the meaning and constitutionality of that 
statute is not addressed by the present Report.  Since initial publication, the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that the detainees at Guantánamo are entitled 
to file habeas petitions and to participate in hearings.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723 (2008). 
 45 See Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Process at Guantanamo, DEP’T DEF. 
(July 2007), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2007/CSRT%20comparison%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 
 46 See id.  
 47 See id. 
 48 Memorandum Implementing CSRT, supra note 43. 
 49 Id. at Enclosure (1), G(3). 
 50 Mr. Abdullah Saleh Ati Ai Ajmi, ISN 220, was represented by counsel in habeas 
litigation.  He was one of the thirty-five detainees who refused to participate in the 
CSRT process but whose full CSRT return was obtained by his attorney under court 
order in the habeas litigation.  See Decl. of James R. Crisfield Jr., Al Ajmi v. United 
States, No. 02-CV-0828 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf . 
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cedures were promulgated.
51
  This was the only meeting between de-
tainee ISN 220 and his personal representative; it lasted only twenty 
minutes, including translation time.
52
  On Monday, August 2, 2004, 
two days after the meeting between the personal representative and 
the detainee, the CSRT was empanelled, the hearing was held, the 
classified evidence was evaluated, and the decision was issued.
53
  De-
tainee 220 did not participate in his CSRT hearing.
54
 
The remainder of the habeas detainees whose CSRT returns 
were among the 102 considered in this Report were processed rapid-
ly: 49% of the hearings were held and decisions were reached by Sep-
tember 30, 2004; 70% by October 31, 2004; and 96% were completed 
by the end of November 2004.  The haste of the tribunals can be seen 
not only in the scheduling of the hearing but also in the speed with 
which the tribunals reached verdicts.  In 81% of the 102 full CSRT re-
turns, the tribunal’s decision was reached the same day as the hear-
ing. 
In addition, almost 40% of the final administrative decisions 
were made after the last tribunal decision.  During this six weeks after 
the tribunals ended and the bulk of the decisions were made, thirty-
five of the thirty-eight detainees who were found to no longer be 
enemy combatants were still detained. 
IV. THE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE 
Each of the 558 detainees who received a CSRT proceeding was 
advised on at least three occasions that he would also have the right 
to a habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia.
55
  The Department of Defense order of July 
7, 2004, directed that each detainee be informed within ten days that 
he was entitled to a CSRT proceeding and that each detainee was also 
 
 51 See Detainee Election Form, Al Ajmi v. United States, No. 02-CV-0828 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf.   
 52 Id.  
 53 Memorandum from James R. Crisfield Jr., Legal Advisor, to Dir., Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal, Al Ajmi v. United States, No. 02-CV-0828 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 
2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf.   
 54 Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, Al Ajmi v. United States, 
No. 02-CV-0828 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf.   
 55 See Memorandum Establishing CSRT, supra note 4, at 1.  
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entitled, if the detainee so chose, to proceed with habeas litigation in 
a U.S. district court to challenge his detention at Guantánamo Bay.
56
  
Pursuant to this order, each detainee would receive a hand-delivered 
formal written notice of his rights.
57
 
The English version of the notice, translated for and delivered to 
every detainee in accordance with the Defense Department order of 
July 7, 2004, provides that: 
The U.S. Government will give you an opportunity to contest 
your status as an enemy combatant.  Your case will go before a 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal, composed of military officers.  
This is not a criminal trial and the Tribunal will not punish you, 
but will determine whether you are properly held. . . . 
As a matter separate from these Tribunals, United States 
courts have jurisdiction to consider petitions brought by enemy 
combatants held at this facility that challenge the legality of their 
detention.  You will be notified in the near future what proce-
dures are available should you seek to challenge your detention in 
the U.S. courts.  Whether or not you decide to do so, the Comba-
tant Status Review Tribunal will still review your status as an ene-
my combatant.
58
 
This document then informed each detainee that he would be ac-
corded a CSRT, whether or not the detainee chose to participate.
59
  
The document also informed the detainee that the CSRT was only 
one of his legal rights and that the other was the right to file petitions 
with “United States courts.”
60
 
V. THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
The CSRT procedures provide that each detainee has to be as-
signed a “personal representative” and require that the personal rep-
resentative meet with the detainee before the CSRT hearing.
61
  The 
personal representative must advise the detainee of the CSRT process 
and remind the detainee, for a second time, that he has an indepen-
dent right to habeas corpus.
62
 
The records of meetings between detainees and their personal 
representatives indicate that in 78% of the 102 full CSRT returns, the 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (4).  
 58 Id. 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at Enclosure (1), C(3); id. at  Enclosure (3). 
 62 Id. at Enclosure (3). 
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detainee and the personal representative met only once.  Such meet-
ings were typically brief: 91% of these meetings lasted two hours or 
less, 51% lasted an hour or less, 6% lasted thirty minutes or less, 13% 
lasted twenty minutes or less, and 2% lasted ten minutes or less.  The 
time spent in the meetings included the time spent translating and 
the time spent conveying specific information about the process, the 
personal representative’s role, and the option of petitioning the fed-
eral court.
63
  The length of these meetings did not leave much time 
for detailed communication, much for less meaningful consultation 
between the personal representative and the detainee. 
At that initial meeting with each detainee, the personal repre-
sentative had several tasks, including warning the detainee that the 
personal representative was not the detainee’s lawyer and that noth-
ing discussed during the meeting would be held in confidence: 
I am neither a lawyer nor your advocate, but have been given the 
responsibility of assisting your preparation for the hearing.  None 
of the information you provide me shall be held in confidence and I may be 
obligated to divulge it at the hearing.  I am available to assist you in 
preparing an oral or written presentation to the Tribunal should 
you desire to do so.
64
 
This statement makes clear both that the detainee had no advocate in 
the process and that the detainee had the right to not participate in 
the process.  After receiving this information, 32% of the detainees 
opted not to participate in the CSRT proceedings. 
The meetings with the personal representatives typically oc-
curred very shortly before the tribunal hearing.
65
  The records of 
meetings between detainees and their personal representatives indi-
 
 63 See, e.g., Detainee Election Form, Modaray v. Bush, No. 05-301 (D.D.C. Jul. 28, 
2005), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_815-893.pdf; Detainee Election Form, Al Warafi v. Bush, No. 04-
CV-1254 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_815-893.pdf.. 
 64 See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (3) (emphasis 
added). 
 65 Compare Detainee Election Form, Hicks v. United States, No. 02-CV-0299 
(D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2004) (a meeting with representative on September 17, 2004), availa-
ble at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf, with Combatant Status Review Tribunal Report Cover 
Sheet, Hicks v. United States, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2004) (tribunal deci-
sion reached on September 22, 2004) [hereinafter Statement, Al Hilal], available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf. 
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cate that for 24% of the detainees, the meeting with the personal 
representative was held the day of or the day before the CSRT pro-
ceeding.  For 55% of the detainees, the meeting occurred between 
two days and a week before the hearing.  Only 7% of the detainees 
met with their personal representatives more than two weeks prior to 
the CSRT proceeding. 
In 52% of the cases, the personal representative made substan-
tive statements to the tribunal.  Many times, however, the representa-
tives did not say a word (12%) and other times the representative 
made only formal non-substantive comments (36%).  Furthermore, 
in a number of cases, the personal representative advocated for the 
government. 
Detainees frequently expressed the view that the CSRT process 
was not an opportunity to “contest” their status as enemy combatants 
but rather another form of interrogation. Seven percent of the detai-
nees who did physically appear in their CSRT proceeding made vo-
luntary statements on the record indicating that they understood this 
to be a continuation of their interrogation and not a true hearing. 
The documents show that some detainees objected to the per-
sonal representative’s role as an aid to the tribunal rather than as an 
assistant to the detainee.
66
  In 8% of all records reviewed, the detai-
nees suggested, without being asked, that the personal representative 
or the tribunal were a form of interrogation rather than a hearing.  
In every occasion when the detainee objected to his personal repre-
sentative serving as the government’s agent against him, the detai-
nee’s objections were ignored.
67
 
Contained in the records for detainee ISN 1463 is the following 
exchange: 
Detainee: My personal representative is supposed to be with me.  
Not against me.  Now he is talking like he is an interrogator.  How 
can he be an attorney?  I said all of these allegations were fabri-
cated and I told you I had nothing to do with them.  It’s up to the 
Recorder or Reporter to respond or provide the proof.  I’m afraid 
to say anything that you might use against me.  As you know, there 
is no attorney here today and I don’t know anything about the 
law.  I don’t know which of these statements are going to be used 
for me or against me.  Whoever is representing the Government 
needs to provide evidence. 
 
 66 See, e.g., Summarized Detainee Sworn Statement at 6, Al Hilal v. Bush, No. 05-
148 (D.D.C. July 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_4818-4946.pdf . 
 67 See, e.g., id. 
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I cannot say anything that can be used against me.  I am 
even afraid to say what my name is. 
Anything else I say, I am afraid is going to be used against 
me. 
I hope that you can forgive me.
68
 
Although the CSRT procedure requires the personal representa-
tive to advise the detainee of the tribunal process and the detainee’s 
rights under the process, the personal representatives on a number of 
occasions neglected to do this.
69
 
Ali Ahmed Mohammed Al Rahizi, ISN 45, did not appear at his 
CSRT hearing.
70
  Al Rahizi’s personal representative received the 
“Summary of Evidence” against Al Rahizi on September 23, 2004
71
 
and met with Al Rahizi for twenty minutes on September 28, 2004.
72
  
According to the “Conclusions of the Tribunal” section of the “Un-
classified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision,” Mr. Al Rahizi de-
clined to participate in his CSRT proceeding: 
The detainee understood the Tribunal Proceedings, but chose 
not to participate . . . . The Tribunal questioned the personal rep-
resentative closely on this matter and was satisfied that the per-
sonal representative had made every effort to ensure that the de-
tainee had made an informed decision.
73
 
The tribunal’s close questioning of the personal representative is 
problematic because the form that the personal representative pre-
sented to the tribunal stated that he had neither read the written 
procedures to the detainee nor left a written copy them with the de-
tainee.
74
 
 
 68  Id. at 6–7.  
 69 See Detainee Election Form, Al Rahizi v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 
2004) [hereinafter Election Form, Al Rahizi], available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_370-443.pdf.   
 70 Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 1, Al Rahizi v. Bush, 
No. 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Summary, Al Rahizi], available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_370-443.pdf.  
 71 See  Memorandum from Officer in Charge, to Personal Representative, Al Ra-
hizi v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_370-443.pdf.   
 72 See  Election Form, Al Rahizi, supra note 69.   
 73 Summary, Al Rahizi, supra note 70.     
 74 Election Form, Al Rahizi, supra note 69.   
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According to the CSRT record, Mr. Al Rahizi’s brother submit-
ted a sworn affidavit on his behalf.
75
  The tribunal declined to consid-
er the sworn affidavit, determined that the detainee had chosen not 
to participate in the CSRT, and found Mr. Al Rahizi to be an enemy 
combatant.
76
  The personal representative made no comment during 
the proceeding.
77
 
At least once, the personal representative did not advise the de-
tainee of his right to appear before the tribunal until after that hear-
ing had already taken place and the tribunal made its decision.  Every 
personal representative was required to complete a “Detainee Elec-
tion Form” as soon as the representative finished the first meeting 
with a detainee.
78
  In the case of Musa Abed Al Wahab, ISN 58, the 
CSRT “Decision Report Cover Sheet” concluded that the tribunal de-
termined that the detainee was an enemy combatant following an Oc-
tober 20, 2004, hearing, in which the detainee chose not to partici-
pate.
79
  There is nothing remarkable about this except for the fact 
that the Detainee Election Form was dated October 25, 2004.
80
  It is not 
clear how the personal representative could have advised the tribunal 
that the detainee had affirmatively declined to participate when he 
had yet to meet with the detainee. 
VI. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTION  
OF VALIDITY OF GOVERNMENT EVIDENCE 
A. Burden of Proof 
The published rules for CSRT proceedings formally place the 
burden of proof that the detainee is an enemy combatant upon the 
government, not the detainee: “Tribunals shall determine whether 
 
 75 Affidavit of Abdullah Ahmed Muhammed al Rezehi, Admin. Review Bd., 
Round 1 Transcripts, available at 
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/45-ali-ahmad-muhammad-al-
rahizi/documents/2.  
 76 Id. at 2.   
 77 Id.  
 78 See, e.g., Detainee Election Form, Al Wahab v. Bush, No. 05-520 (D.D.C. May 6, 
2005) [hereinafter Election Form, Al Wahab], available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_444-565.pdf. 
 79 Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report Cover Sheet, Al Wahab v. 
Bush, No. 05-520 (D.D.C. May 6, 2005), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_444-565.pdf 
 80 Election Form, Al Wahab, supra note 78. 
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the preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that each 
detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy comba-
tant.”
81
  This language might seem inconsistent with the language of 
the notice that was read to each detainee to inform him of the CSRT 
procedures: 
The U.S. Government will give you an opportunity to contest your 
status as an enemy combatant.  Your case will go before a Comba-
tant Status Review Tribunal, composed of military officers.  This is 
not a criminal trial and the Tribunal will not punish you, but will 
determine whether you are properly held . . . .
82
 
The language “an opportunity to contest your status as an enemy com-
batant”
83
 might suggest that it is the detainee, and not the govern-
ment, who bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that the detai-
nee is not an enemy combatant.  Indeed, the order also refers to the 
determination of combatant status made before the CSRT process: 
“Each detainee subject to this Order has been determined to be an 
enemy combatant through multiple levels of review by officers of the De-
partment of Defense.”
84
  Further, the summary of evidence, which the 
personal representative provided to each detainee at the start of their 
first meeting, repeats this refrain.  Each summary of evidence in-
cludes the following statement: 
The United States Government has previously determined that the 
detainee is an enemy combatant.  This determination is based on 
information possessed by the United States that indicates that the 
detainee is . . . .
85
 
In sum, while the burden of proof was placed formally on the 
government, the controlling documents clearly suggest the presump-
tive correctness of the detentions.  A tribunal would have to find that 
“multiple levels” of military review were all in error in order to find a 
detainee to not be an enemy combatant.  In any event, the debate 
about who bore the burden of proof may not be worth pursuing in 
light of the presumption mandated by the procedures that the evi-
dence was valid.  The presumption is detailed below. 
 
 81 See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), G(11).   
 82 Id. at Enclosure (4). 
 83 Id. (emphasis added). 
 84 See Memorandum  Establishing CSRT, supra note 4 (emphasis added). 
 85 See, e.g., See Memorandum from Officer in Charge, to Pers. Representative, Al 
Rahizi v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2004) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_370-443.pdf.   
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B. Presumption of Validity of Government Evidence 
While the CSRT procedures formally placed the burden of per-
suasion on the government, they simultaneously mandate that the 
tribunal consider the classified evidence as presumptively valid: 
There is a rebuttable presumption that the Government Evi-
dence, as defined in paragraph H(4) herein, submitted by the 
Recorder to support a determination that the detainee is an ene-
my combatant, is genuine and accurate.
86
 
The effect of this presumption of validity of classified evidence is to 
meet, if not lift, the government’s burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the detainee was properly classified as an 
enemy combatant.  The detainee is presumed to be an enemy comba-
tant based upon the classified evidence.  Although the detainee may, 
in theory, rebut the presumption, the requirement that the detainee 
does so effectively shifts the burden of persuasion to him. 
However objectionable it may be to place the burden of proof 
on the government with one hand and simultaneously presume that 
it is satisfied with the other, the CSRT procedures are even more 
problematic in light of their concomitant command that the detainee 
be denied access to the evidence itself.
87
  The evidentiary presump-
tion might in theory be rebuttable, but because the evidence is classi-
fied and kept secret from the detainee, he is unable to challenge, ex-
plain, or simply rebut it.  The rebuttable presumption of validity 
becomes, in practice, an irrebuttable presumption. 
This explains why, although the burden of proof was supposedly 
on the government, the government never had to present a single 
witness at any of the 393 CSRT hearings.  Instead, it relied almost ex-
clusively on the secret, and presumptively valid, classified evidence.  
In reality, the burden was on the detainee to prove that the classified 
evidence was wrong.  Yet, the detainee was denied access to the evi-
dence that might have enabled him to do so. 
VII.  THE HEARING 
Each CSRT took place in a small room.
88
  Armed guards brought 
the detainee—shackled hand and foot—to the room, seated him in a 
 
 86 See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), G(11). 
 87 See id. 
 88 Photographs of the CSRT rooms are available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/combatant_tribunalsarchive.html. See also Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, First Military Commission Convened at Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba (Aug. 24, 2004) [hereinafter First Commission], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7667; Tim Golden, For 
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chair against the wall and chained his shackled legs to the floor.
89
  
The detainee faced the recorder (the prosecutor for this proceed-
ing), the personal representative (seated beside the recorder), a para-
legal, and the interpreter.
90
  The three tribunal members, all military 
officers, sat to the right of the detainee behind the covered table. 
91
 
VIII.  THE EVIDENCE 
Typically, the government provided the detainee with only a 
document known as the “Unclassified Summary of the Evidence” that 
was marked R-1 by the recorder.
92
  The boilerplate “Discussion of Un-
classified Evidence” in most records reads: “Exhibit R-1 is the Unclas-
sified Summary of Evidence.  While this summary is helpful in that it 
provides a broad outline of what the tribunal can expect to see, it is 
not persuasive in that it provides conclusory statements without sup-
porting unclassified evidence.”
93
 
The “Unclassified Summary of Evidence” often made it impossi-
ble for detainees to address its thrust.  For example, the transcript of 
the proceeding for detainee ISN 1463 recounts: 
Detainee: That is not true.  I did not help anybody and whoever is 
saying that I did, let them present their evidence.  If I know that 
somebody presented any evidence, then somebody can tell me 
what that evidence is so that I can respond to it.  If there is any   
. . . . 
Detainee: That’s not true.  Again, whoever has any evidence to 
prove, let them present it.  If somebody submitted any evidence, 
I’d like to take a look at it to find out if that evidence is true . . . . 
. . . . 
Detainee: It’s not fair for me if you mask some of the secret in-
formation . . . . How can I defend myself?
94
 
The CSRT procedures accord a broad range of powers to the 
tribunal for the production of evidence.  The tribunal has the power 
 
Guantánamo Review Boards, Limits Abound, NYTIMES.COM (Dec. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/31/us/31gitmo.html?scp=2&sq=describe+comba
tant+status+review+tribunals&st=nyt. 
 89 See, e.g., id. 
 90 Pictures of the rooms’ layout are available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/combatant_tribunalsarchive.html.  (emphasis added) 
 91 See supra note 90. 
 92 See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 2, Al Wadi v. 
Bush, No. 04-CV-1227 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_444-565.pdf. 
 93 See, e.g., id. 
 94 Statement, Al Hilal, supra note 66, at 3. 
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to order members of the U.S. military to appear as witnesses, the 
power to request civilian witnesses to testify,
95
 and the power to order 
production of any document in the possession of the U.S. govern-
ment.
96
  Despite these powers, the government did not produce a sin-
gle witness—military or civilian—during the unclassified portion of 
any of the 393 detainees’ records.  The CSRT procedures give the de-
tainee a right to question witnesses against him,
97
 but that right is only 
theoretical because the government never presented any witnesses. 
A. Government Unclassified Documentary Evidence 
The CSRT procedures anticipate that the government will pro-
duce unclassified evidence at the hearing.  The procedures explicitly 
require that the personal representative advise the detainee of his 
right to see such unclassified evidence.
98
  According to the 102 full 
CSRT returns, the government did not present any witnesses and 
rarely presented non-testimonial evidence to the detainee prior to 
the hearing.  A review of the 361 transcripts reveals that the govern-
ment may have shown the detainee some evidence before he began 
his statement in 4% of the cases.  When the hearing began, 89% of 
the detainees had no facts to rebut, whether from witnesses or from 
documentary evidence.  The same documents also reveal that the tri-
bunal showed the detainee unclassified information in 7% of the 
hearings.  It is unclear why the tribunal showed unclassified evidence 
in some cases but not in others. 
As explained below, 49% of the 102 full CSRT returns contain 
some form of unclassified evidence presented by the government.  
This number is in stark contrast to the 4% of detainees who had 
access to unclassified information prior to their hearings and to the 
7% of detainees who were shown unclassified information during 
their hearings. 
Each CSRT return includes an “Unclassified Summary of the Ba-
sis for Tribunal Decision,” including the unclassified evidence against 
the detainee.
99
  Twenty-nine of the 102 full CSRT returns also contain 
 
 95 See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), E(2). 
 96 Id. at Enclosure (1), E(3).   
 97 Id. at Enclosure (1), H(7).  
 98 Id. at Enclosure (3).  
 99 See, e.g., Summary, Hicks, supra note 17; Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tri-
bunal Decision, Ruhani v. Bush, No. 05-2367 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf; Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, 
Wasiq v. Bush, No. 05-2386 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2006), available at 
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a recorder’s “Exhibit List,” which cites every piece of classified and 
unclassified evidence that the tribunal considers.
100
  In addition, 
sometimes unclassified evidence is appended to the full CSRT re-
turns.
101
  These appended exhibits may or may not be listed in either 
the recorder’s “Exhibit List” or the “Unclassified Summary of Basis 
for Tribunal Decision.”  Based on these three sources, unclassified 
evidence against detainees appears in 48% of the 102 full CSRT re-
turns.  Thus, for 52% of the CSRT hearings, the government had no 
unclassified evidence and relied solely upon the presumptively valid 
classified evidence to meet its burden of proof. 
1. Types of Government Unclassified Evidence Presented 
to Tribunal 
The government introduced five types of unclassified evidence 
in the CSRT hearing: 
? documents from friends and family102 
? submissions from habeas corpus litigation103 
? publicly available documents either released by the Gov-
ernment or published by the press that name the detainee 
at issue
104
 
? publicly available documents either released by the Gov-
ernment or published by the press that do not name the 
detainee
105
 
 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf. 
 100 See, e.g., Recorder Exhibit List for [REDACTED], Al Murbati v. Bush, No. 04-
CV-1227 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_444-565.pdf. 
 101 See, e.g., Summary, Al Wadi, supra note 92. 
 102  See e.g., Answers to the Questions for the Family of Abd Alaziz Sayir Al Shama-
ri, Al Shammeri v. United States, No. 02-CV-0828 (D.C.C. Oct. 15, 2004)[hereinafter 
Answers, Al Shamari], available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf. 
 103 See e.g., Amended Complaint, Al Odah v. United States, No. CV 02-0828 (D.D.C 
July 8, 2002), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf. 
 104 See e.g., Executive Order 13224, Abdullah v. Bush, No. 05-301(D.D.C. July 25, 
2005), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_92-190.pdf. 
 105 See e.g., Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, U.S.  Bureau of Border Pro-
tection, Qadir v. Bush, No. 05-2370 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2007), available at 
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? non-publicly available documents that particularly con-
cern the detainee
106
  
For 47% of the detainees whose tribunal considered unclassified 
documents, this evidence consisted of documents and letters written 
by friends and family of the detainees.  Correspondence written by 
family and friends generally lacks inculpatory value.  Eighteen per-
cent of the records contained habeas corpus pleadings.  Motions tak-
en from habeas corpus proceedings also lack inculpatory value.  Of 
the full CSRT returns that considered unclassified documents, 29% 
contained public records that did not refer to the detainees.  The in-
culpatory value of these documents is tenuous because the docu-
ments were used to establish that certain groups are terrorist organi-
zations; they did not, however, directly accuse the detainee of any 
wrongdoing.
107
  Of the full CSRT returns that reflected unclassified 
documents, 10% contained public records that identified the detai-
nee by name.  The inculpatory value of these documents is more ap-
parent.  An additional 14% of the sample set contained non-publicly 
available documents directly pertinent to the detainee.  Included in 
this group were documents labeled “For Official Use Only” 
(FOUO),
108
 discussed below, as well as Bosnian court investigation 
documents
109
 and a mental health record.
110
  The inculpatory value of 
these documents seems more apparent; however, there is no indica-
tion the detainees ever saw these documents. 
Most unclassified documents in a detainee’s full CSRT return 
did not allow the detainee to effectively contest his status as an enemy 
combatant, particularly when the detainee was not allowed to view 
this unclassified evidence. 
 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf. 
 106 See, e.g., Answers, Al Shamari, supra note 102, at 3. 
 107 See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, Mahnut v. Bush, 
No. 05-1704 (D.D.C.  Oct. 27, 2004)[hereinafter Summary, Mahnut], available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1893-2014.pdf . 
 108 See, e.g., Recorder Exhibit List, Hicks v. United States, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 1, 2004)[Exhibit List, Hicks], available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf. 
 109 See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 110 Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, Mahdi v. Bush, No.05-
665 (July 13, 2004)[hereinafter Summary, Mahdi] (mental health records), available 
at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_3291-3416.pdf. 
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2. Unclassified FOUO Evidence Withheld from Detainee 
Unclassified evidence included, but was not limited to, docu-
ments labeled FOUO.  These documents, however, were consistently 
treated as if they were classified throughout the CSRT process.  For 
example, the record did not discuss these documents in the “Unclas-
sified Summary of the Basis for Tribunal Decision.”
111
  The FOUO 
documents primarily consisted of interrogations of the detainee.
112
  
Without access to these FOUO documents, the detainee was not able 
to clarify the statements made, claim that the statements were made 
as a result of torture, or dispute whether the statements were made at 
all. 
The existence and reliance upon FOUO evidence was not re-
vealed in any of the 356 FOIA-produced transcripts.  In most in-
stances, the existence of FOUO evidence was revealed in the “Re-
corder’s Exhibit List,” which was produced only as part of the habeas-
compelled full CSRT returns.
113
  Consequently, but for the habeas pe-
titions, the government’s reliance on this variety of secret evidence 
would never have been revealed. 
Recorder’s exhibit lists were found for only 28% of the detai-
nees’ full CSRT returns.  Exhibit lists, when present, however, show 
that the government relied upon unclassified FOUO evidence for 
83% of the hearings.  The record also shows that when the govern-
ment relied upon unclassified FOUO evidence, this evidence was al-
ways withheld from the detainee.  In essence, the detainees were not 
shown any of the evidence used against them, classified or unclassi-
fied.  Not only was the FOUO evidence withheld from the detainees 
in violation of the CSRT procedures, but other declassified evidence 
was also withheld. 
B. The Detainee’s Opportunity to Present His Evidence 
Records indicate that, other than the unclassified summary of 
evidence, as many as 96% of the detainees began the presentation of 
their cases without hearing or seeing any facts upon which the gov-
ernment based its determination that the detainee was an enemy 
combatant.  Detainees presented their cases without knowing the 
facts they had to rebut. 
 
 111 See, e.g., Summary, Hicks, supra note 17. 
 112 See, e.g., Exhibit List, Hicks, supra note 108. 
 113 See, e.g., id.  
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The CSRT procedures provided that each detainee would have 
the right to present evidence to the tribunal.  The CSRT procedures 
provide that: 
(6) The detainee may present evidence to the Tribunal, including the 
testimony of witnesses who are reasonably available and whose tes-
timony is considered by the Tribunal to be relevant.  Evidence on 
the detainee’s behalf (other than his own testimony, if offered) 
may be presented in documentary form and through written 
statements, preferably sworn.
114
 
Of the detainees who chose to participate in their hearings, 
more than half (55%)
115
 attempted to not only inspect the classified 
(or perhaps unclassified) evidence but also to produce their own wit-
nesses or documentary evidence.  Most requests for the production of 
evidence at the hearing, however, were denied.
116
   
1. Witness Requests 
One-third of detainees who participated in their hearings re-
quested that witnesses testify on their behalf.  Other detainees re-
fused to participate because their requests were denied.
117
  Among the 
records, only 26% of the detainees that requested witnesses were able 
to get any of those witnesses produced by the tribunal.  Of the detai-
nees who requested the testimony of other detainees at Guantánamo, 
83% were denied. 
Further inspection of the data reveals that only 4% of these de-
tainees were able to obtain all of their requested witnesses, and 22% 
of these detainees were able to have only some of their witnesses pro-
duced.  In total, 74% of the detainees who requested witnesses were 
denied the production of any witnesses by the tribunal.  The tribunal 
denied witness requests if it deemed the witnesses either “not reason-
ably available,” “irrelevant,” or, in at least one egregious example, be-
 
 114 See Memorandum Implementing CSRT, supra note 43, at Enclosure 1, F(6) 
(emphasis added). 
 115  Some detainees sought more than one kind of evidence, such as witnesses, 
non-testimonial evidence, or the opportunity to review classified evidence.  The anal-
ysis that follows reviews the evidence requested and permitted without associating it 
with the total requests of any particular detainee. 
 116 See, e.g., Memorandum from Legal Advisor to Dir., Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal at 3, Begg v. Bush, 04-CV-1137 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/publicly_filed_CSRT_records_28
69-2990.pdf. 
 117 See, e.g., Memo, Al Kandari, supra note 24. 
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cause “the Tribunal would have been burdened with repetitive, cu-
mulative testimony.”
118
 
For example, ISN 277 requested seventeen witnesses.  The tri-
bunal president decided that the detainee could only have two of 
these witnesses because he determined that “all of the witnesses 
would probably testify similarly, if not identically.”
119
  The tribunal 
president gave no basis for the belief that the witnesses would testify 
similarly or identically, and, as ISN 277’s personal representative 
pointed out to the tribunal, there was no basis in the CSRT proce-
dures for denying a witness based on redundancy.
120
 
Some detainees requested witnesses located outside Guantána-
mo, and some requested witnesses from within the base—but in ei-
ther case, they called for the testimony of another detainee.
121
  More 
than half of the detainees who requested witnesses requested the tes-
timony of witnesses who were not at Guantánamo.  All requests for the 
testimony of detainees not detained at Guantánamo were denied.
122
  
The detainees who asked for witnesses from inside Guantánamo were 
successful in producing some of those witnesses only 50% of the time. 
Nineteen percent of the participating detainees requested wit-
nesses from outside Guantánamo, but these requests were never suc-
cessful.  Thus, as the data shows, the only witnesses that any of the de-
tainees were able to produce to testify on their behalf were other 
Guantánamo detainees.
123
  The “Unclassified Summary of the Basis 
for Tribunal Decision” lists the evidence that was considered and the 
evidence that the tribunal did not consider.
124
  The data shows that 
only 26% of the detainees who requested witnesses had witnesses 
whose testimony was considered by the tribunal.  Broken down fur-
ther, the data shows that the tribunal considered all witnesses testi-
mony for those detainees who requested witnesses only in 4% of the 
cases.  All of the witnesses considered were detainees testifying for 
 
 118 Summary, Mahnut, supra note 107, at 2. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id.  
 121 See, e.g, Summary, Hassen, supra note 24, at 2; Summary, Mahdi, supra note 
110, at 2 (mental health records), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_3291-3416.pdf; Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Deci-
sion at 2–3, Al Kandari v. Bush, 02-CV-0828 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_2737-2868.pdf.  
 122 See, e.g., Summary, Hassen, supra note 24, at 1. 
 123 See, e.g., id. 
 124 See, e.g., Summary, Hicks, supra note 17. 
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each other.  In sum, the detainees were denied the right to produce 
any testimonial evidence other than, in some circumstances, the tes-
timony of some of their fellow detainees. 
2. Unclassified and Classified Evidence Requests 
Twenty-nine percent of the detainees requested unclassified-
documentary evidence prior to their hearings.  For the detainees who 
requested unclassified evidence, it was only produced 40% of the 
time.  Twenty-five percent of the detainees who requested this evi-
dence had all of their evidence produced, while 15% of these detai-
nees had only some of the requested evidence produced.  The docu-
mentary evidence that the tribunal allowed consisted mostly of letters 
from parents and friends and were accorded little weight by the tri-
bunal.
125
 
During their hearings, more than 14% of the detainees re-
quested the opportunity to view the classified evidence against 
them.
126
  These requests were always denied.
127
 
4. Evidence Detainees Were Permitted to Present 
The tribunals denied more evidence than they permitted and 
denied almost all evidence that would be persuasive.  As discussed 
previously, detainees’ requests for witnesses not detained at Guantá-
namo were always rejected,
128
 and detainees’ requests to see any of the 
government’s classified evidence were always denied.
129
  Detainees’ 
requests for testimony from other detainees were usually denied.
130
  
 
 125 See, e.g., Statement, Al Wadi, supra note 26. 
 126  An examination of the 361 available transcripts reveals that 18% made a re-
quest for classified evidence, but, for purposes of this section, analyzing all eviden-
tiary requests, the 14% statistic corresponds to our sample set, the 102 full CSRT re-
turns. 
 127 See Tribunal Members Questions to Detainee at 12, Amin v. Bush, No. 02-
CV0828 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 2004)(on file with Center). 
 128 See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 1–2, Jarabh v. 
Bush, No. 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1625-1730.pdf; cf. Summary, Hicks, supra note 17, at 3 (granting 
the detainee’s witness request initially but never procuring the witness for the detai-
nee).  
 129 See, Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1). 
 130 See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 2, Al Rawi v. 
Bush, No. 04-CV-1144 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2004) (denying request for detainee’s wit-
ness), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_4103-4236.pdf; cf. Summary, Hassen, supra note 24, at 1–2 (grant-
ing detainee’s witness request). 
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The detainees, however, were allowed to present their documentary 
evidence, at least in part, 40% of the time. 
The picture of the type of evidence that was permitted is bleak.  
But, when the number of detainees who had any evidence to present 
upon their behalf is considered, the picture is bleaker still.  Based 
upon the 361 available transcripts, for as many as 89% of detainees, 
no evidence was presented on their behalf.  The evidence in support 
of the remaining 11% was limited to testimony from other detainees 
and letters from friends and families.  Taken as a whole, 96% of the 
detainees were shown no facts by the government to support their de-
tention as enemy combatants, and 89% of the detainees had no evi-
dence of their own to present.  The 11% who did proffer evidence 
were allowed to introduce only unpersuasive evidence: family letters 
and other testimony from other detainees. 
5. Reasons for Denying the Detainees’ Evidence 
The CSRT procedures empower the tribunal to “[o]rder U.S. 
military witnesses to appear and to request the appearance of civilian 
witnesses if, in the judgment of the tribunal president those witnesses 
are reasonably available.”131  The procedures also permit the CSRT Tri-
bunal to: 
request the production of such reasonably available information in 
the possession of the U.S. Government bearing on the issue of 
whether the detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an 
enemy combatant, including information generated in connec-
tion with the initial determination to hold the detainee as an 
enemy combatant and in any subsequent reviews of that determi-
nation, as well as any records, determinations, or reports generat-
ed in connection with such proceedings.
132
 
The CSRT procedures do not define “reasonably available,” and 
the detainee has no right to appeal a determination that certain evi-
dence is either unavailable or “irrelevant.”  The reasons that the tri-
bunals gave for the refusal to allow detainees to present evidence 
vary.  The three most common reasons were: 
? The evidence or witness was not “reasonably available.”133 
? The evidence or witness was not relevant.134  
 
 131 See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), E(2) (em-
phasis added). 
 132  Id. at Enclosure (1), E(3) (emphasis added). 
 133 See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Decision at 2, Al Hajj v. 
Bush, No. 04-CV-1166 (D.D.C.  Oct. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_5069-5181.pdf. 
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? The request for production of evidence or the witness 
was not made to the personal representative during the 
D-A meeting and was thus too late.
135
 
The tribunals sometimes did not give any reason for denying 
evidence.  Sometimes, the tribunals also refused to permit the intro-
duction of documentary evidence in the possession of the govern-
ment.  For example, Al Harbi, ISN 333, appeared before a tribunal 
and identified documents that he said would exonerate him and ex-
plain that he was not an enemy combatant: “It is important you find 
the notes on my visa and passport because they show I was there for 8 
days and could not have been expected to go to Afghanistan and en-
gage in hostilities against anyone.”
136
 
During the proceeding for detainee ISN 680, the following ex-
change took place: 
Questions to Recorder by Tribunal Members 
Q: Are you aware if the passport is in control of the U.S. Govern-
ment here in Guantánamo? 
A: No, sir, I’m not aware. 
Questions to Detainee by Tribunal Members 
Q: If we were to see a copy of your passport, what are the dates it 
would say you are in Pakistan? 
A: The date of my entry to Pakistan, the dates I have on my visa, 
they all exist there.  Even in Pakistan, we were received by Ameri-
can investigators.  We were interrogated by American interroga-
tors in Pakistan. 
Q: How long have you been here at the camp? 
A: I really don’t know anymore, but most likely 2 to 2 1/2 years.
137
 
The passport was neither located nor produced, and the detainee was 
promptly found to be an enemy combatant.
138
 
 
 134 See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Decision at 2, Al Raimi v. 
Bush, No. 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_977-1088.pdf. 
 135 See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Decision at 2, Mar’i  v. 
Bush, No. 04-CV-1254 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2004), available at  
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_3071-3189.pdf. 
 136 Summarized Sworn Detainee Statement at 3, Al Harbi v. United States, (D.D.C. 
Sept. 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/Set_16_13
63-1446.pdf.  
 137 Summarized Sworn Detainee Statement at 2, Hassan v. United States, No. 04-
CV-1194 (D.D.C May 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_3417-3443.pdf. 
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For Khi Ali Gul, ISN 928, the Tribunal President said: 
[W]e will keep this matter open for a reasonable period of time; 
that is, if we receive back from Afghanistan this witness request, 
even if we close the proceedings today, with new evidence, we 
would be open to introducing or re-introducing any witness 
statements we might receive.
139
  
Khi Ali Gul requested that his brother be produced as a witness and 
provided the tribunal with his brother’s telephone number and ad-
dress.
140
  Instead of calling the phone number provided, which might 
have produced an immediate result, the government instead sent a 
request to the Afghan embassy.
141
  The Afghan embassy did not re-
spond within thirty days, and the witness was not produced.
142
  The 
tribunal then found that the witness was not “reasonably available,” 
determined that the detainee was an enemy combatant, and never 
reopened the hearing.
143
 
In another case, an Algerian detainee requested court docu-
ments from an earlier hearing in Bosnia at which the Bosnian courts 
acquitted him of terrorist activities.
144
  The tribunal concluded that 
these official court documents were not “reasonably available” even 
though the “Unclassified Summary of the Basis for Decision” dis-
cussed another document from the same Bosnian legal proceed-
ings.
145
  The aspects of the Bosnian proceedings that the tribunal con-
sidered were not the records that the detainee requested.
146
  
Apparently, according to the government, some records from a for-
mal Bosnian trial are “reasonably available” but others are not.  The 
record provided no explanation as to why the government did not 
 
 138 See generally id. 
 139 Summarized Sworn Detainee Statement at 2, Gul v. Bush, No. 05-00877(D.D.C. 
May. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_4237-4315.pdf. 
 140 Id. at 3.   
 141 Id. at 2. 
 142 Id.  
 143 Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 2, Gul v. Bush, No. 05-
00877 (D.D.C. May 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_4237-4315.pdf. 
 144 Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 2, Al Hajj v. Bush, No. 
04-CV-1166 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_5069-5181.pdf. 
 145 Id. at 3. 
 146 Id.   
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obtain the requested records.  The tribunal found that this detainee, 
like the others, was an enemy combatant.
147
 
In the case of Allal Ab Aljallil Abd Al Rahman Abd, ISN 156, the 
detainee sought the production of medical records from a specified 
hospital: 
During the hearing, the detainee requested that the Tribunal 
President obtain medical records from a hospital in Jordan. . . .  
The Tribunal president denied the request.  He determined that, 
since the detainee failed to provide specific information about the 
documents when he previously met with his Personal Representa-
tive, the request was untimely and the evidence was not reasona-
bly available.
148
 
The detainee’s failure to mention this request to his personal repre-
sentative is not a reason to deny the evidence, at least according to 
the CSRT procedures.
149
  CSRT procedures provide two reasons to 
deny requested evidence: that it is irrelevant and that it is “not rea-
sonably available.”
150
 
VIII. TRIBUNAL EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE 
Once the detainee leaves the hearing chamber, the tribunal is 
supposed to review and evaluate the classified evidence for the first 
time.  What occurred after each detainee left the hearing was never 
recorded or at least no record has been released.  While we have no 
access to the classified evidence, much of the classified evidence was 
apparently hearsay.  The CSRT procedures permit the use of hearsay, 
but require the tribunal to first determine the reliability of the hear-
say: 
The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence such as would 
apply in a court of law.  Instead, the Tribunal shall be free to con-
sider any information it deems relevant and helpful to a resolu-
tion of the issue before it.  At the discretion of the Tribunal, for exam-
ple, it may consider hearsay evidence, taking into account the 
reliability of such evidence in the circumstances.
151
 
 
 147 Id. at 1.   
 148 Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, at 2, Al Rahman Abd v. 
Bush, No. 06-CV-1254 (D.D.C Oct 18, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_815-893.pdf. 
 149 See generally Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9. 
 150 Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), F(6). 
 151 Id. at Enclosure (1), (G)7 (emphasis added). 
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The tribunal’s basis for decision describes the rationale for de-
termining that a detainee is an enemy combatant.
152
  A review of the 
102 full CSRT returns, however, shows that the tribunal apparently 
never questioned the reliability of hearsay.  Three issues compound 
the severity of the tribunal’s failure to evaluate the reliability of the 
hearsay.  First, the source of the hearsay was usually anonymous; 
second, there was great confusion about the names of the detainees; 
and third, there was some evidence of the coercion of declarants. 
A. Hearsay from Anonymous Sources 
A legal adviser reviewed each tribunal decision.
153
  It is not possi-
ble to definitively analyze the quality of the hearsay evidence because 
it is unavailable, but the statement of the legal adviser reviewing the 
tribunal’s decision for ISN 552 demonstrates the problem: 
Indeed, the evidence considered persuasive by the Tribunal is 
made up almost entirely of hearsay evidence recorded by uniden-
tified individuals with no first hand [sic] knowledge of the events 
they describe.
154
 
Outside of the CSRT process, this type of evidence is more commonly 
referred to as “rumor.” 
In one instance, the personal representative made the following 
comments regarding the record of proceedings for ISN 32: 
I do not believe the Tribunal gave full weight to the exhibits re-
garding ISN [redacted]’s truthfulness regarding the time frames 
in which he saw various other ISNs in Afghanistan.  It is unfortu-
nate that the 302 in question was so heavily redacted that the Tri-
bunal could not see that while ISN [redacted] may have been a 
couple months off in his recollection of ISN [redacted]’s appear-
ance with an AK 47, that he was six months to a year off in his re-
collections of other Yemeni detainees he identified.  I do feel with 
some certainty that ISN [redacted] has lied about other detainees 
to receive preferable treatment and to cause them problems while 
in custody.  Had the Tribunal taken this evidence out as unrelia-
ble, then the position we have taken is that a teacher of the Koran 
 
 152 See, e.g., Summary, Hicks, supra note 17, at 1. 
 153 See, e.g., Memorandum from James R. Crisfield Jr., Legal Advisor, to Dir., Com-
batant Status Review Tribunal, Al Kandari v. United States, No. 02-CV-0828 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 22, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_2737-2868.pdf.   
 154 See, e.g., id. 
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(to the Taliban’s children) is an enemy combatant (partially be-
cause he slept under a Taliban roof).
155
 
B. Possible False Identities or Misnomers 
It is black-letter evidence law in a normal settings that, while 
hearsay may sometimes be admissible, the reliability of hearsay evi-
dence always depends upon the reliability of the hearsay declarant.
156
  
Because the government’s own records misidentified the detainees 
more than 150 times, the problem of reliability in the case of the de-
tainees is apparent’.
157
 
On April 19, 2006, the government published the names of the 
558 detainees who had CSRT proceedings at Guantánamo.
158
  On May 
15, 2006, the government also published a list of 759 names that 
represented all those detainees who were detained at Guantánamo 
until then.
159
  In addition, the government released transcripts and 
other documents related to administrative review board hearings that 
also contain detainee names.
160
 
These three groups of records contain more than 900 different 
versions of detainee names.  Adding other government documents, 
such as the full CSRT returns and other legal documents, the number 
rises to more than 1,000 different names.  Yet, according to the gov-
ernment, only 759 detainees have passed through Guantánamo “from 
January 2002 through May 15, 2006.”
161
  The more than 1,000 differ-
ent names do not mean that there were more than 1,000 detainees at 
 
 155 Personal Representative Review of the Record of Proceedings, Ahmed v. Bush, 
No. 05-301 (D.D.C. July 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_92-190.pdf. 
 156 See FED. R. EVID. 801–07. 
 157 Documents showing a comparison of names throughout the CSRT and Admin-
istrative Review Board process are on file with the Center.   
 158 List of Detainees Who Went Through Complete CSRT Process, FIDH, 
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/doc_7_-_detainee_list.pdf.(last visited Feb. 2, 2011).   
 159 List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba 
from January 2002 Through May 15, 2006, U.S. DEP’T DEF., 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/detaineesFOIArelease15May2006.pdf.Gua
ntánamo (last visited Sept 1, 2011) [hereinafter List of Individuals Detained].   
 160 The procedures provide that each prisoner found to be an enemy combatant 
must go through an administration review board process every year following the 
CSRT’s conclusion that the detainee is an enemy combatant.  Memorandum from 
the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts, et al., at Enclosure (3) 
(July 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf  (de-
scribing the ARB procedures).   
 161 List of Individuals Detained, supra note 159. 
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Guantánamo, but it does establish the difficulty of identifying indi-
viduals in these circumstances. 
If after more than four years of interrogation the government 
did not know the names of its own detainees, confusion about the 
identity of detainees clouded any analysis of the evidence at the CSRT 
hearings.  In short, there should be considerable concern when a tri-
bunal relies upon hearsay declarants who may be talking about 
someone other than the detainee to whom the declaration is suppo-
sedly directed.  For example, one detainee responded to the claim 
that his name was found “on a document.”  The detainee stated: 
There are several tribes in Saudi Arabia and one of these tribes is 
Al Harbi.  This is part of my names [sic] and there are literally 
millions that share Al Harbi as part of their name.  Further, my 
first names Mohammad and Atiq are names that are favored in 
that region.  Just knowing someone has the name Al Harbi tells 
you where they came from in Saudi Arabia.  Where I live, it is not 
uncommon to be in a group of 8–10 people and 1 or 2 of them 
will be named Mohammed Al Harbi.  If fact, I know of 2 Mo-
hammed Al Harbis here in Guantánamo Bay and one of them is 
in Camp 4.  The fact that this name is recovered on a document is 
literally meaningless.
162
 
C. Possible Coercion 
Apparently no tribunal considered the extent to which the gov-
ernment obtained any hearsay evidence through coercion.  While the 
effects of torture, or coercion more generally, would obviously apply 
to inculpatory statements from the detainee himself, the possibility 
should also have been considered by a tribunal weighing all state-
ments and information relating to the detainee which may have been, 
in the words of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, “obtained as a 
result of coercion.”
163
  This statute was not enacted until December 
 
 162 Dep’t of Def., supra note 27.  Mohammad Atiq Al Harbi, ISN 333, stated that 
there were documents available to the United States that would prove that his classi-
fication as an enemy combatant was wrong.  Id.  Mr. Al Harbi also objected to ano-
nymous secret evidence:  
It is important you find the notes on my visa and passport because they 
show I was there for 8 days and could not have been expected to go to 
Afghanistan and engage in hostilities against anyone. . . .  I understand 
you cannot tell me who said this, but I ask that you look at this individ-
ual very closely because his story is false.  If you ask this person the 
right question, you will see that very quickly.  I am trusting you to do 
this for me. 
Id. 
 163 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006).  The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 provides in part: 
b) Consideration of statements derived with coercion. 
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2005, after the CSRT process was complete, but indications of torture 
or coercion suffered by a detainee should have at least raised hearsay 
concerns, which the tribunal is required to consider.
164
  The record 
does not indicate such an inquiry by any tribunal.  Instead, the tri-
bunal usually made note of allegations of torture and referred them 
to the convening authority.
165
  This fact is less surprising than the fact 
that several tribunals found a detainee to be an enemy combatant be-
fore receiving any results from such investigation.  While there is no 
way of ascertaining the extent, if any, to which coercion might have 
affected witness statements’, 18% of the detainees alleged torture; in 
each case, the detainee volunteered the information rather than res-
ponding after been asked by the tribunal or the personal representa-
tive.  Also, in each case, the panel proceeded to decide the case be-
fore any investigation was undertaken. 
IX. ACTIONS OF THE CSRT WHEN A DETAINEE PREVAILED 
Nevertheless, the detainees sometimes won—at least initially.  
The Department of Defense order of July 14, 2006, states that: 
The Director, CSRT, shall review the Tribunal’s decision and may 
approve the decision and take appropriate action, or return the 
record to the Tribunal for further proceedings.  In cases where 
the Tribunal decision is approved and the case is considered final, 
the Director, CSRT, shall so advise the DoD Office of Detainee Af-
fairs, the Secretary of State, and any other relevant U.S. Govern-
ment agencies.
166
 
If the director of the CSRT decides, he may send any decision back to 
the CSRT for further proceedings,
167
  which means that the detainee 
can be subjected to multiple hearings until the government is satis-
 
(1) Assessment. The procedures submitted to Congress pursuant to 
subsection (a)(1)(A) shall ensure that a Combatant Status Review Tri-
bunal or Administrative Review Board, or any similar or successor ad-
ministrative tribunal or board, in making a determination of status or 
disposition of any detainee under such procedures, shall, to the extent 
practicable, assess— 
(A) whether any statement derived from or relating to such detainee 
was obtained as a result of coercion; and 
(B) the probative value (if any) of any such statement.  
Id.  
 164 Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at  Enclosure 1, (G)7. 
 165 See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 3, Nechle v. 
Bush, No. 04-CV-1166 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2004), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_4947-5068.pdf.  
 166 Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure 1, (I)8. 
 167 Id. 
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fied with the ruling.  The additional hearings were always conducted 
outside the detainee’s presence, and the detainee was never notified 
of his “victory” in the first proceeding.
168
 
At least three detainees were initially found to not be enemy 
combatants and then subjected to multiple re-hearings until they 
were ultimately found to be enemy combatants.
169
  Several detainees 
had second hearings, and at least one detainee, after the first and 
second hearings unanimously found him not to be an enemy comba-
tant, had yet a third hearing—again in absentia—which finally found 
him to be an enemy combatant.
170
  The government’s record for one 
detainee whose proceeding was returned for a second hearing stated: 
“On 24 November 2004, a previous Tribunal unanimously deter-
mined that the detainee was not properly designated as an enemy 
combatant.”
171
 
The record continued: “On 25 January 2005, this Tribunal, upon 
review of all the evidence, determined that detainee #654 was proper-
ly [unanimously] designated as an enemy combatant.”
172
 
A more egregious record of a detainee twice subjected to tribun-
als is that of detainee ISN 250.  The following excerpts present a vivid 
example of just how little was needed to determine that a detainee 
was not an enemy combatant.  Detainee ISN 250 elected not to ap-
pear in person before the tribunal, but the tribunal considered his 
statement and unanimously found that he was improperly designated 
as an enemy combatant.
173
  That decision, however, did not stand for 
long.  The government’s own legal sufficiency review as written by 
Commander James R. Crisfield, Jr., U.S. Navy, synopsized the 
processing of detainee ISN 250’s case: 
A letter from the personal representative initially assigned to 
represent the detainee at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, reflects the de-
tainee’s elections and is attached to the Tribunal Decision Report 
 
 168 See supra note 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 169 See supra note 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 170 See supra note 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 171 Memorandum from Peter C. Bradford, Assistant Legal Advisor, to Director, 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal at 1, Alghazawy v. Bush, No. 05-2378 (D.D.C. Sept. 
20, 2006), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_3190-3290.pdf.. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Memorandum from James R. Crisfield Jr., Legal Advisor, to Dir. at 2, Comba-
tant Status Review Tribunal, Al Oshan, No. 05-0520 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2005), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1731-1808.pdf. 
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as exhibit D-b.  The original Tribunal proceedings were held in 
absentia outside Guantánamo Bay with a new personal representa-
tive who was familiar with the detainee’s file.  This personal repre-
sentative had the same access to information and evidence as the 
personal representative from Guantánamo Bay.  The addendum 
proceedings were conducted with yet a third personal representa-
tive because the second Personal Representative had been trans-
ferred to Guantánamo Bay.  This Personal Representative also 
had full access to the detainee’s file and original Personal Repre-
sentative’s pass-down information.  The detainee’s Personal Rep-
resentatives were given the opportunity to review the respective 
records of proceedings and both declined to submit post-tribunal 
comments to the Tribunal.
174
 
Despite the initial finding that the detainee was not an enemy comba-
tant and the obvious difficulties reflected in this tortured process, 
Commander Crisfield concluded that “[t]he proceedings and deci-
sion of the Tribunal, as reflected in enclosure (3), are legally suffi-
cient and no corrective action is required.”
175
  Commander Crisfield 
recommended approval of the decision of the subsequent hearing 
that found detainee ISN 250 to be an enemy combatant.
176
 
The record of the third decision for yet another detainee, ISN 
556, whose proceeding was returned twice, stated the following in a 
memorandum prepared after his third tribunal: “On 15 December 
2004, the original Tribunal unanimously determined that the detai-
nee should no longer be designated as an enemy combatant.”
177
  Fol-
lowing the initial hearing, the tribunal’s membership was changed. 
The record continued: 
Due to the removal of one of the three members of the original 
tribunal panel, the additional evidence, along with the original 
evidence and original Tribunal Decision Report, was presented to 
tribunal panel #30 to reconsider the detainee’s status.  On 21 
January 2005 that tribunal also unanimously determined that the 
detainee should no longer be classified as an enemy combatant.
178
 
The tribunal’s membership was subsequently changed yet again: 
 
 174  Id. at 3. 
 175  Id. 
 176  Id.  
 177 Memorandum from James R. Crisfield Jr., Legal Advisor, to Director, Comba-
tant Status Review Tribunal at 2839, Abdulla v. Bush, No. 05-1001 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 
2006), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_2737-2868.pdf. 
 178 Id. 
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Once again, additional information regarding the detainee was 
sought, found, and presented to yet a third tribunal.  This addi-
tional additional [sic] information became exhibits R-23 through 
R-30.  This time, the three members of the second tribunal were 
no longer available, but the one original tribunal member who 
was not available for the second tribunal was now available for the 
third.  That member, along with two new members, comprised 
tribunal panel #34 and sat for the detainee’s third tribunal.  Fol-
lowing their consideration of the new additional information 
along with the information considered by the first two tribunals, 
this Tribunal determined that the detainee was properly classified 
as an enemy combatant.
179
 
The records of other detainees suggest additional instances of 
rehearings.  In these proceedings, the tribunal reconvened and con-
sidered an issue about the quality of the evidence, but there is no 
record of what transpired at the first hearing, why the second hearing 
occurred, or the effect of the issues of concern about the quality of 
the evidence. 
X. BOTTOM LINE 
The Secretary of the Navy described the CSRT as “a one-time re-
view to determine if a person, a detainee, is or is not an enemy com-
batant.”
180
  Five hundred fifty-eight detainees had hearings before the 
CSRT from 2002 to 2006.  As a result of the CSRT process, thirty-
eight detainees, or 7% of the total, were released from Guantánamo 
having been found not to be enemy combatants.  In contrast to these 
numbers, no detainee in the sample set reviewed in this Report was 
ultimately found either to not be, or to no longer be, an enemy com-
batant as a result of the CSRT—even though some were initially 
found to be either “non-enemy” combatants or “no longer” enemy 
combatants by a first (or even a second) tribunal. 
The difference between a “non-enemy” combatant and one who 
is “no longer” an enemy combatant is not clear.  The label “non-
enemy combatant,” however, implies that the government mistakenly 
detained the prisoners in the first instance, while “no longer enemy 
combatant” implies that the prisoner was once an enemy combatant, 
but his detainment at Guantánamo Bay successfully rehabilitated 
him.  Despite these connotations, the government appears to consid-
er the labels interchangeable. 
 
 179 Id. 
 180 Gordon England, U.S. Sec’y of the Navy, Defense Department Special Briefing 
on Combatant Status Review Tribunals’ (Mar. 29, 20050, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2504. 
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For example, Secretary of the Navy Gordon England used both 
terms when he described the CSRT process on March 29, 2005. 
The Tribunals also concluded that 38 detainees were found to no 
longer meet the criteria to be designated as enemy combatants. . . 
. 520 enemy combatants, 38 non-enemy combatants. . . .  It should 
be emphasized that a CSRT determination that a detainee no 
longer meets the criteria for classification as an enemy combatant 
does not necessarily mean that the prior classification as [an 
enemy combatant] was wrong.
181
 
XI. CONCLUSION 
This Report lays out the CSRT process, both as it exists on paper 
and as it was implemented at Guantánamo.  While the procedures 
promised detainees an opportunity to present evidence in the form 
of witnesses and documents, in reality the only evidence permitted in 
the vast majority of cases was the testimony of the detainee.  In most 
cases the tribunals returned decisions on the same day and among 
the 102 records reviewed for this Report, the ultimate decision was 
always unanimous, and almost all detainees reviewed were ultimately 
found to be enemy combatants.  In its attempt to replace habeas cor-
pus, the government instead created this no-hearing process. 
 
 181 Id. 
